













The paper examines the current explosion of identity politics in Ethiopia 
and its entanglement with territoriality. It explains how neighboring groups 
negotiate, contest, re/construct and deconstruct their politico-territorial 
positions. It focuses on the processes by which the rules of political 
participation produce and reinforce ethno-territoriality, and examines the 
interplay between ethnic identity politics, territoriality and pastoral 
livelihood. Taking the case of the pastoral Gabra and their relationship 
with their neighbors, the Borana in Southern Ethiopia, I argue that the rule 
of political participation, whether it is practical or mere elite aspiration, 
has created a new form of territoriality that has altered the long-standing 
local inter-group relationships and negatively affected the local livelihoods.       
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Political Structure and Policies in the Post-1991 Ethiopia  
In 1991 a regime that had ruled Ethiopia for 17 years was defeated by 
ethnic based insurgents; among others, the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). Upon gaining power, EPRDF’s 
program evolved into a Provisional Charter – the document by which the 
country was ruled between 1991 and 1995. The Charter secured support 
from numerous ethnic based political parties, among whom the Oromo 
Liberation Front (OLF) is considered a co-author of the Charter. In 1994 the 
Provisional Charter evolved into the constitution of the country (Young 
1998; Abbink 1997). The constitution has reorganized the country into nine 
putatively autonomous ethnic-based regional states and two city states. Six 
of the regional states: Afar, Amhara, Harari, Oromia, Somali and Tigray are 
considered ‘mother’ states of the people after which they are named. The 
remaining three regional states: the Southern Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples Regional State (SNNPRS), the Gambela and Benishangul-Gumuz 
regional states are known as multi-ethnic states, despite the fact that they 
also are ethnically organized at their sub-state levels. Depending on the size 
of their population, ethnic groups are given regional, zonal or district 
statuses. The constitution, further, states that ‘Every nation, nationality and 
people in Ethiopia has an unconditional right to self-determination, 
including the right to secession’ (Article 39 (1))2.  
The new constitution and the administrative structure it instituted have 
set in motion two interrelated issues having academic and political values. 
First, the constitution defined ethnic groups, except for one point, namely 
‘belief in a common or related identities’, by their ‘objective’ criteria. 
Second, the constitution has basically changed the approach to nationhood 
from the Ethiopian state point of view. Previously, Ethiopian regimes had 
always been discouraging any reference to ethnic and linguistic issues.3 
They always liked to portray Ethiopia as a supra-ethnic nation. The 
provincial divisions had followed lines of communications, and 
systematically designed to cross-cut ethnic divisions. To the contrary, the 
                                                 
2 The terms ‘nation’, ‘nationality’ and ‘people’ are still pretty vague (as evidenced by the 
name of SNNPRS) their usage are the same to ethnic group.  
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new system unequivocally recognized Ethiopia’s cultural diversity as a 
composite of ‘nations and nationalities’. Indeed, the constitution has been 
noted as unprecedented in giving the ‘nations and nationalities’ the right to 
‘self-determination’ up to cessation (Baylis 2004; Aalen 2006; Young 
1996).  
EPRDF, the architect of the system, justifies the necessity of 
decentralizing power along ethnic lines as an adequate response to past 
centralism and the Amhara ethnocratic dominance of the Ethiopian state 
(Aalen 2006). Previously, as was commented by Markakis (1974), when the 
Amhara were perceived to be the ruling group, adoption of Orthodox 
Christianity and the Amharic language were the only way to gain political 
power or to be employed in the state administration (cited in Aalen 2006: 
246). The decentralization is, thus, a means to correct the legacy of ethnic 
domination and marginalization in the history of the Ethiopian state and the 
need for reconstruction of the state (Aalen 2006: 245). Hence, by giving 
each ethnic group a distinct administration, the EPRDF government claims 
to defuse ethnic tensions and longstanding ethnic conflicts. In this view, 
ethnic politics is considered an ‘emancipatory politics’.  
Critics, however, have pointed out that ‘ethnic federalism is a mere 
sham to disguise the hegemony of a single ethnic group’ (Baylis 2004: 559). 
According to this view, by transforming the country into ethnically defined 
regional states and creating ethnically defined parties under its control, the 
leadership from the ethnic minority of Tigray, a dominant force in EPRDF, 
is able to better command the whole country (Merera, 2005; Aalen 2006; 
Tronvoll 2003; Pausewang et al. 2002; Turton 2006; Aalen and Tronvoll 
2009).  
Others have pointed out that the ethnic tension the government was 
meant to diffuse has continued, and in some cases have even been 
aggravated (Hussein, 2002; Fekadu 2009; Bassi 2010). Either by de fault or 
design the new conflicts are mostly at the periphery – between the new 
ethno-national states and within the states. As this paper also shows, some 
of the contestations and competitions over resources are at a district levels 
or even below that.   
Notwithstanding the alleged hegemonic control of the EPRDF from the 
centre, the new political structure has ‘re-mapped’ Ethiopia after more than 
one century of unitary state organization (James et al 2002; Schlee 2003). 




The major ethnic groups, as mentioned above, have become ethno-national 
regional states. Others are given zone (province) or district statuses. This 
has reshaped the peoples’ imagination about the country. Every ethnic 
group tends to emphasize on its own ethno-regional administration. This has 
encouraged ‘the further strengthening of ethnicity as a political identity…’ 
(Abbink 1997: 173) and played a significant role in solidifying ethnic 
boundaries and in consolidating ethno-territoriality, as well as, in extreme 
cases, even in producing new ethnic groups. These have been manifested 
mainly in the contestations and negotiations over ethnic identity and ethnic 
territory.  
 
 Institutionalization of Negotiations over Identity 
The Ethiopian constitution has put in place a system for scrutinizing and 
officially recognizing ethnic identities and negotiations when disputes and 
contestations over identity arise. The examination of ethnic identity and 
disputes over territory is the responsibility of the second chamber of the 
parliament known as the House of Federation. It is ‘the highest political 
authority on the questions of nationality’ (Negarit Gazeta 2001:1610).4 The 
first chamber, the House of People’s Representatives, has legislative power, 
and its members are elected directly from districts within each regional 
state. In contrast, the House of Federation is composed of the 
representatives of each of the ethnic groups who are assigned by the 
member states. The House of Federation officially represents the ‘Nations, 
Nationalities and People’ of Ethiopia. All recognized ethnic groups have at 
least one representative, which increases according to population size (one 
more representative for each million member of an ethnic group).  
In 2001 the House of Federation established an office known as the 
Constitutional and Regional Affairs. The main duty of this office is to 
coordinate and investigate issues related to ethnic identity and disputes over 
ethno-national territory. The office has 15 members drawn from the 
regional states’ presidents and members of the House of Federation. It is a 
forum for the people who claim their identity is either not recognized or 
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who have other related problems.5 Procedurally, ‘Any nation , nationality or 
people who believe that their self identities are denied, its right of self-
administration is infringed, promotion of its culture, language and history 
are not respected …may present its application to the House through the 
proper channel’ (Negarit Gazeta 2001:1610).  
Such state policies and constitutional provisions have a significant 
effect on the sort of identity politics and territoriality I am examining in this 
paper. Making ethnicity an organizing principle of the state at all levels of 
the state structures, the regime intertwined identity and resources. An ethnic 
group recognized by the state gets an administrative status that brings 
resources from the state. As administrative units are equated with ethnic 
groups or even clans (as it is the case in the Somali National Regional 
State), negotiation for resources, state and pastoral, has become group-
based. Individual actors negotiate on behalf of a certain ethnic group or 
clans. This has created ethnic identity entrepreneurs who negotiate, file 
appeals and litigate for identity and associated territory for a given group in 
relevant offices of the regional and federal states. This made ethnic identity 
more important than ever before.  
As a result, claims to become ethnic groups with their own ethnic 
territory have been continuously emerging since the implementation of the 
ethnic based federal state policy. In 2001 the Siltie community, which had 
been regarded as one of the clans of the Gurage, voted on their ethnicity 
(Smith 2007) and transformed themselves from a clan to a distinct ethnic 
group. This entails, among others, an administrative unit that would permit 
access to state resources. Many groups have applied for recognition 
following the Silte’s model. Some have already secured the recognition, and 
many more are on the waiting list. Between 1995 and 2000 the number of 
officially recognized ethnic groups, who have representatives in the House 
of Federation, was fifty-eight. From 2001 to 2010 this figure reached 
seventy-five. 6  Only in 2007 and 2008 four and five ethnic groups 
                                                 
5 Interview with Ato Daniel, Secretary of the Constitutional and Regional Affairs, 
04.01.2007, Addis Ababa. 
6 Interview with an official of the House of Federation, 01.02.08, Addis Ababa.  




respectively were recognized by the House of Federation.7 One more is 
added in 20158. After more than two decades of ethnic federalism, Ethiopia 
is still experimenting ethnic identity politics.  
Next, I will discuss identity politics and territoriality at a local level by 
taking the case of the pastoral Gabra and their relation with their neighbors, 
the Borana, in Southern Ethiopia. This article is a result of my over one 
decade engagement in research among the pastoral Oromo and Somali of 
Southern Ethiopia. Most of the data were collected between 2006 and 2007 
during fieldwork for my PhD dissertation. Methodologically, it attempts to 
re/construct how the macro-political processes are appropriated and used by 
different actors at the local level. The data were collected using an amalgam 
of several qualitative data collection instruments such as informal 
discussions, attending public meetings, focus group discussions and semi-
structured interviews.          
 
The Gabra’s Contested Identity 
The Gabra are Oromo-speaking camel pastoralists inhabiting Southern 
Ethiopia and Northern Kenya. A few Gabra inhabiting Southern Ethiopia 
also speak Somali. The Gabra in southern Ethiopia and in northern Kenya 
are called Gabra Miigo and Gabra Malbe respectively. Both of them claim 
common origin. The Gabra in Ethiopia, with whom this paper is concerned, 
currently inhabit the Borana and Guji zones of Oromia National Regional 
State (hereafter, Oromia NRS) and the Liban zone of the Somali National 
Regional State (hereafter, Somali NRS). The majority of them are sparsely 
distributed among the Borana Oromo.  
                                                 
7 Addis Admass, a weekly News Paper, www.Addisadmas.com, accessed on 23.o5.2009. 
According to interview with an official from the Constitutional and Regional Affairs, four 
groups were waiting for recognition in 2008. These were, (1) the Wolene (known as one of 
the Gurage clans) demanded separation from the Gurage; (2) the Manjo (a cast group 
among the Shakicho) demanded separation from Shakicho; the Dube (a group who claim a 
Bantu origin among the Somali ) requested to be separated from the Somali, and (4) the 
Darawa demanded a change from the Somali to the Oromo (Interview on 04.01.2008, 
Addis Ababa)   
8 Qimant was declared as an ethnic group on 13 March 2015. 




The ethnic identity of the Gabra has been a matter of academic debate 
for decades (See Schlee 1989, 2008; Megerssa and Kassam 1994; Kassam 
2006). Schlee (1989) argues that the Gabra were originally Somaloid or part 
of what he called a ‘Proto Rendile Somali’ (PRS) society that had been in 
control of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya before the expansion of 
Oromo population in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. According to 
Schlee, the Gabra adopted the Oromo language keeping at the same time 
some of their earlier cultural markers such as ‘camel culture’, housing style 
and calendar (see also Schlee 2008a, b). On the contrary, Kassam and 
Megerssa (1994) argue that the Gabra were originally Oromo and adopted 
some of the Somali material and ritual cultures as they were marginalized 
due to their ritually junior position vis-à-vis the Borana. In her recent article 
Kassam (2006) presented the ethno-genesis of the Gabra as ‘a ‘composite’ 
society which is made up of segments that originate from many of the 
communities that inhabit the Lake Turkana (formerly Lake Rudolf) and 
beyond it […]’ (2006: 173).  
Most other ethnographers on the Gabra (see for example, Tablino 1999; 
Soga 2007; Wood, 1999, 2000), and the Gabra oral historians agree that 
they have a deep-rooted ethno-historical substratum that relates them to 
both the Oromo and Somali. Their ‘camel culture’, which manifests itself in 
their everyday life and rituals; their cross-cutting ties with the Garri Somali 
clans, and their calendar make the Gabra consider themselves closer to the 
Somali than the Oromo. On the other hand, other variables such as their 
language (Afaan Oromo); their age and generation set, and the territory 
where they predominantly live, which is the base of their subsistence, make 
them part of the Oromo nation rather than the Somali.  
Recently, in the situation of intensified identity politics, their identity 
has become a contested subject among the Gabra themselves. This has been 
further complicated by the fact that the Moyale district, where the majority 
of the Gabra live, is contested between the Oromia and the Somali national 
regional states. The Gabra are represented both in the Oromo and Somali. 
The Gabra elite who secured job in Oromia have claimed Oromoness and 
those who have got job in the Somali national regional state claimed 
Somaliness (Fekadu 2009, 2010). In the following section, I will discuss the 
traditional Gabra-Borana interactions around pastoral resource use to 
provide the readers with some livelihood information as a background 




against which the present theme – politics of territoriality among the 
pastoral Gabra – is discussed.    
 
Accommodative Pastoral Resource Use 
A long-standing Borana-Gabra relation around pastoral resource use had 
been accommodative. This was enabled by a socio-culturally oriented ritual 
based co-existence and a compartmentalization of resource use. Let me 
discuss each of them in brief. 
 
Ritual Interdependence and Resource Use 
Both the Borana and Gabra have an interdependent generation set system 
popularly known as the gada system, which depends on the ritualized gift 
exchanges they make to initiate ritual performances (Fekadu 2009; Schlee 
1989 and 1998; Kassam 2006). Such a relationship between the Borana 
gada and the Gabra gada had enhanced a peaceful co-existence and a 
smooth sharing of resources, especially water. The Borana and Gabra 
pastoralists depend on a few water wells; some of which were dug centuries 
ago. Both groups consider well sites as sacred. Peace, respect and truth, as 
ideals for smooth sharing of the water, are considered important for the 
wellbeing of the wells (See also Adano and Witseburg 2008). People are 
careful not to ‘disrespect’ the well site. Consequently, dispute between the 
two groups over water use had been quite rare. The Borana, who have had 
managed the watering schedule, have always venerated the Gabra ritual 
leaders’ role in blessing these wells. This has been manifested in a ritual 
performed by a Gabra qallu every year at one of the well sites named Eel 
Golota. The qallu kills a ram (an uncastrated sheep) and puts its tail in the 
well. The ram is known as korma cinii (tick ram). Performing the korma 
cinii ritual is believed to protect livestock from being infested by ticks and 
secures the general health and fertility of the livestock. Otherwise, 
according to the Borana elders “even if grass and water are plenty they 
could not put on weight and prosper”.9  
These have had enabled the Gabra and the Borana to co-exist. In the 
context of the pastoral livelihood, even though they have had no control 
                                                 
9  Interview with Borbor Bule, Yabello, 07.07.06; with Kanu Jilo, Yabello, 23.10.06. 




over any of the water points, their ritual power made the Gabra an important 
neighbour to the livelihood of the Borana10.  
   
 
Spatial Compartmentalization and Resource Use  
The longstanding peaceful sharing of resources between the Borana and 
Gabra could also be explained by the different niches they have historically 
exploited. 11  The two groups avoided competition by emphasizing 
exploitation of different niches (Schlee 1989: 39, 51; Soga 2007). Even 
though the Borana and Gabra claim common territory, there is no village 
which they shared. They established their villages based on their ecological 
preferences. The Borana livelihood is based on cattle husbandry, while the 
Gabra are mostly dependent on camel herding.12 Cattle must be watered 
every three days as compared to the camels that need watering every 10-15 
days.  
Therefore, the Borana cattle usually graze within 15-25 kilometers 
radius from a given well source. This has necessitated the Borana to settle 
down in the villages mostly within 16 kilometers radius from the wells, 
which allow the cattle to commute between their villages and the wells in 
one day. Even when movements are necessary due to long dry season, the 
villagers tend to return to the same site when the situations improve. On the 
other hand, the Gabra camel herders exploit wider areas, including those 
where water sources are remote, without developing a strict control over a 
defined territory and water points. Camels also browse bushy and shrubby 
areas while cattle need herbaceous pasture. Thus, while the Borana use the 
highland, the camel herding Gabra frequently use the marginal lowlands in 
the same general territory.  
                                                 
10 Since the well-being of these wells requires the cooperation of all the users, the 
neighbours of the Borana who share the wells participate not only in ritual performance but 
also in the maintenance of the wells. They also cooperate in providing labour in case of 
watering livestock, which is a very painstaking work (Soga 2007).   
11A niche is ‘the place of a group in the total environment, its relation to resources and 
competitors’ (Barth 1956: 1079; see also Barth 1969a: 19).  
12  According to a survey conducted in the 1980s, more than 90% of Borana family’s cash 
income is derived from livestock and nearly all from cattle (Coussins and Upton 1987:211). 




This occupation of different ecological niches in the pastoral 
environment helped the two groups to minimize competition over the 
resources. It was also ecologically, economically and socially adaptive. 
However, with changes in the political landscape, in the context of currently 
intensified identity politics and associated ethno-territoriality, the Gabra 
elite complain that the Gabra are victims of their past livelihood strategy. 
The Gabra thus began to question the soundness of their livelihood strategy 
and perhaps of their mode of relationship with their former compatriots-the 
Borana as have been elaborated in the following discussions.   
 
Nomadic Pastoralist Gabra and Ethno-territoriality 
The focus of this section is on how the policies of the state have been 
appropriated, negotiated and used by the local individuals and collectivities 
representing the Gabra. In the post-1991 context, the Gabra found 
themselves in an awkward situation vis-à-vis their neighbors. That is, in a 
sharp contrast with their neighbors: they don’t have a territory they can call 
‘their own’. The new generation regrets that their ancestors failed in the past 
to occupy a defined territory. The following statement is what a Gabra elite 
regretfully told me in 2007 in Moyale, “The Gabra had been number one in 
camel wealth in this region. Our fathers have been following after the tail of 
large herd of camels, they had never settled down. You see how much that 
affected us today”.13 This was particularly relevant in the post-1991 socio-
political situation when the Gabra’s neighbors scramble for territory that 
suddenly placed the Gabra in an inconvenient position as the following 
quote clearly shows:   
 
The Guji have their own land; the Borana have their own land; the Garri 
have their own land; the Konso have their own land; the Burji have their 
own land. Malbe have their own land. Gabra have no land. People who 
do not have land, who do not have kebele14 and woreda [district] are 
                                                 
13       Interview with Huqa Abdi, 13.06.2006, Moyale 
14  Territorial units of the lowest level of administration 




people no more. Borana simply say “this land belongs to the Gabra and 
the Borana”, but they do not want to give us even a single kebele.15 
 
This informant clearly expressed not only the importance of having one’s 
own ethnic territory but also the relationship between the state’s group-
based allocations of administrative unit, which is associated with a specific 
territory. In other words, it shows the present reality of the association 
between identity politics and territoriality in Ethiopia. The informant was a 
pastoralist without any formal education, and just spoke his mind from his 
experience of the neighbors of the Gabra who have some form of 
administrative unit under their control. What is interesting is that his idea 
resonates with the constitution of the country, which the informant had 
never read. According to the constitution, to be an ethnic group or as the 
constitution refers to it, ‘nation, nationality and people’ territory is an 
essential element. 16  With the implementation of ethno-national 
administration, the perception and importance of territory has been changed 
among the local pastoralists.  
Pastoralists used to emphasize on what the territory has (pasture and 
water) and access to them rather than on ‘the ownership’ of the territory 
itself. This had been the case especially for numerical minority groups such 
as the Gabra. Truly, territory has never been perceived as important as this 
time in the history of the Gabra. Their relative small size and their nomadic 
pastoralism did not allow them or did not necessitate occupation of 
territory17. They had been using water and pasture with their neighbors 
(wherever they migrate) based on traditional resource regime. Now, 
territory becomes more than pasture and water. It is about politics of 
identity and associated state-based resources. As a result, the discourse 
                                                 
15 Interview with Sharamo Jiloo Abdii, 07.06.2006, Moyale 
16Article 39 of the constitution reads that “A “Nation, Nationality or People” for the 
purpose of this constitution, is a group of people who have or share a large measure of a 
common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in common or 
related identities, a common psychological makeup, and who inhabit an identifiable, 
predominantly contiguous territory” (FDRE, Article 39 (5)).  
17 The Gabra elites claim that their number is more than forty thousand in Ethiopia. 
However, the Gabra as a category are not registered in the population census of Ethiopia 
(Fekadu, 2009).  




about the importance of ‘one’s own land’ or ‘one’s own district’ has 
become common among the Gabra. Elders ask saying, ‘where is the Gabra’s 
land?’ Students question the relevance of attending school where they do 
not have district of their own, because from the elite’s perspective, ethno-
territorial administration is also a means of accessing job opportunity for 
their respective group members.  
In addition to ethno-territorial politics, there are underlying economic, 
social and livelihood transformations. These include decline in the number 
of livestock an individual possesses, an increasing reliance on relief food, 
and expansion of social service infrastructure (e.g., education and health 
centers). These factors have encouraged the nomadic Gabra to settle down, 
which enhanced the mushrooming of big villages.18  
Coupled with federal administrative structure, there has been a process 
of devolution of state resources to district level. The regional states allocate 
the bulk of the budget they receive from the federal state to the districts. 
Since 2001 Oromia NRS has been allocating block grants to the districts. 
According to this new scheme, the districts receive money with only 
general provision as to the way it is to be spent. Thus, those who control a 
district control the resources, which means, a recognized ethnic group with 
an administrative unit gets a greater resource share than an unrecognized 
group of equal size (see also Baylis 2004; Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). 
This, obviously, has increased the enthusiasm of ethnic elites to have a 
district status. Therefore, when the Gabra think of territory in the present 
context, their concerns are not only about pastoral resources; but also they 
are about state resources. The state resource is very broad. For the business 
men the state resource is about opening business opportunities including 
getting access to state sponsored contracts, less tightened check points to 
smuggle goods and negotiate over duty and tax. They get contracts of 
diverse kind – building schools, clinics, offices, and transporting relief 
foods. For the elites state resource is about state budget, which they 
exclusively control. They favor those who are related to them in accessing 
                                                 
18 The Gabra villages such as Guchi, Laga Sure and Galab have thousands of inhabitants. 
In 2004, in the Gabra inhabited kebele of Laga Sure 17% of the school age boys and girls 
(6-17) were attending school (A survey report by LVIA (Lay Volunteers International 
Association) an International NGO).  




job opportunities and relief food allocations. These broaden the bases of the 
actors who could engage in the game. 
Thus, the main aspiration of the Gabra elite is to become a ‘nation’, 
followed by a territory on which they exercise administrative authority, 
which in turn comes with the share of the resource pie. It is an aspiration to 
achieve a local level statehood, i.e., nationalism writ small.  
Referring to similar developments in other parts of Ethiopia would add 
a broader picture to my arguments.  Interesting analogies with the Gabra are 
the cases of the Sheekash in the Somali NRS and the Majangir in the 
Gambella Region. The Gabra, Shekaash and Majangir have similarities in 
their relationship with territory; their livelihood strategies; relation with 
their neighbors (ritual or political); their demographic features and above all 
in the strategies they used in the recent endeavors to seek for territory.19 The 
Sheekash is a small Somali clan that inhabits Afdeer Zone of the Somali 
NRS. As a small clan, the Sheekash did not have a distinct territory of their 
own in the past; rather they were allied to bigger clans particularly the 
Ogaaden ‘whom they accompanied as religious scholars and Qur’an 
teachers’ (Hagmann 2007: 215). With the establishment of the Somali NRS 
under ethnic federalism, and the allocation of zones and districts to major 
clans, the Sheekash found themselves in a disadvantaged position since they 
lacked their own distinct territory. As a UN OCHA field staff noted, 
   
The Sheikash who never had and never claimed a place of origin [distinct 
territory], realized that their clan was being threatened by the new 
political developments. (…) With the regionalization process taking 
place along ethnic [or clan] boundaries, it became more and more 
difficult for Sheikash to get employment opportunities in most of the 
Somali Region’ (Guinard 2001b cited by Hagmann. 2007: 215).    
  
 In the course of bloody confrontations with different Ogaaden lineages the 
Sheekash managed to establish a clan territory in West Imi’s Raaso area in 
2001, at least as a base from where to fight the rest (ibid.). The conflict has 
                                                 
19 The Majangir case is different among the three in that they are demographically 
dominated by land hungry recent migrants from highland Ethiopia while the other two are 
already minorities in comparison to the people among whom they have lived for centuries.  




continued. The Sheekash have been favored by the EPRDF, the ruling 
party; since they allied in the war against Ogaaden National Liberation 
Front (Schlee 2006: 6).  
Sarah Voughan (2003) wrote a similar account about the Majangir of 
Western Ethiopia, and the problem they faced to become an ethnic group 
and successfully compete for the resource of the state in the ethnic based 
federalism. According to Voughan, the Majangir are ‘relatively late entrants 
in the competitive process of territorially defining one’s homelands, initially 
disadvantaged by a traditional culture premised on fluid group relations 
with land’ (2003: 273). The Manjangir practiced shifting cultivation. In an 
attempt to catch up with their neighbors, the Majangir utilized a violent 
method in the post 1991 period (ibid). Similar to the Majangir and the 
Sheekash cases succinctly explained by Voughan and Hagmann, territory is 
a ‘missing component’ in the Gabra’s endeavor to become a distinct group 
and share from the benefit such a group would get from the state. 
  
 Gabra’s Request for ‘Special District’ 
The Gabra’s rhetoric of territoriality has come to a concrete political 
demand when they posed a request for a ‘special district’ status in 2006. 
This is in line with Constitutional provision that, ‘a distinct group’ can 
demand for ‘self-administration’, the smallest of which is a ‘special district’ 
(FDRE, 1995). A ‘Special district’ is an administrative unit that is granted 
usually to minorities who occupy a distinct territory within a given regional 
state that is dominated by one or more major ethnic groups. A special 
district is not accountable to the zonal administration within which it is 
located. Rather it is directly accountable to the regional state, which makes 
it administratively parallel to the zone where it is situated.20  
The phrase ‘distinct group’, on the premise of which that the Gabra 
were seeking for special administration status, is marked by a common 
history, language, culture, and territory. However, the Gabra, although they 
could claim a pan Gabra history and culture, neither have a distinct 
language nor speak a distinct language of their own. They speak either 
                                                 
20 Administrative hierarchy in Ethiopia is as follows, in a descending order: The Federal 
state – the national regional states – zones – districts– kebele.  




Oromo or Somali or both languages. They also are not in control of a 
significant territory. In addition to these missing objective markers, the 
Gabra were also aware of their limitations (e.g., demographic, economical 
and political) to be able to engage in territorial contention with the Oromo 
and Somali and demand for their own administration as distinct from both. 
Thus, the Gabra’s aspiration/option to seek for a special administration – a 
‘Gabra special district’ – within the Oromia NRS where the majority of 
them live could only be understood in the context of these limitations and 
missing markers of a ‘ distinct group’.  
Yet, even by claiming for a ‘Special district’ status, the Gabra elite are 
still technically alluding to a demand for recognition of minority status 
within Oromia NRS. But they refrain from explicitly expressing their 
demand in such a tone since it is tantamount to declaring that they are not 
Oromo, which in turn could endanger their livelihood and security at the 
local level and their relation with Oromia at regional state level. It is amid 
these complex and delicate socio-political, economic and ecological 
relations that the Gabra elite articulate their demands for ‘special 
administration’ in the context of ‘a local problem’, often contrasting 
themselves with the Borana, related to good governance and fair access to 
resources. 
Accordingly, the Gabra applied for ‘Aanaa addaa’ (‘special district’) 
within Oromia NRS in early 2006. In July and August of the same year, the 
Gabra elders met with the then president of Oromia NRS in Yabelo (capital 
of Borana zone) and in Addis Ababa respectively, in order to discuss on 
their demand. A three-person team consisting of two Gabra and one Borana, 
all of them government officials was established and entrusted with the task 
of identifying and proposing a specific territory where the ‘Special district’ 
of the Gabra would be established.  
I have been following the Gabra’s ‘Question’ since the summer of 
2006. So far, the team established to come up with a proposal could not 
suggest a certain territory for the establishment of the imagined ‘Special 
district’ of the Gabra. Given the relative small size of the Gabra in each of 
the existing districts as compared to the Borana, the absence of a specific 
territory previously owned by the Gabra, and Gabra’s lack of ‘ownership’ 
right to any of the water points, the team could hardly propose a territory for 
Gabra’s ‘special district’.  In the meantime, tensions were rising between 




the Borana and Gabra. Despite the Gabra elites’ calculated move to reduce 
some of the negative consequences of their demand for special district as 
discussed above, Gabra’s a demand for territory alone was sufficient 
enough to trigger violent conflicts between the Borana and Gabra several 
times.  Already intensified identity politics and the suspicion it has created 
exacerbated these conflicts.   
 
 Battling for Kebele: the Case of Guchi 
In the meantime, the Gabra were busy re/constructing their territory by 
settling down in permanent villages – settlement in search of recognition. 
After settling down, they usually claim kebele status for their villages. 
Currently, there are four kebele exclusively inhabited by the Gabra in the 
Moyale district of Oromia NRS (two of them in Moyale town and two other 
are pastoral kebele). They also have got one kebele in the Moyale district of 
the Somali NRS. They have secured all of them since 1995, the year the 
new constitution was endorsed. A Kebele, as a territorial unit of the lowest 
level of administration, is too small to have a budget. It has very little job 
opportunity. Only two persons (the chairman and the secretary) are paid in a 
kebele administrative structure. The hope of the Gabra is to multiply the 
number of the kebele and eventually form a district that has a resource, i.e. a 
full administrative structure with state allocated budget and job 
opportunities. According to Hagmann (2007), in quite a similar manner, in 
the Somali NRS, pastoralists’ increasing identification with a given territory 
in the last 15 years or so was primarily motivated by their ‘eagerness to 
achieve political recognition through land occupancy’ (2007: 216).   
To further explain the point I am making (identity politics and 
territoriality), I use a case of the conflict occurred in Guchi, one of the four 
kebele of the Gabra in the Moyale district of Oromia NRS. The kebele is 
located 37 kilometers east of Moyale town. In 2007 there were 600 
households, and all of them were Gabra.21 The kebele has an elementary 
school and a health center. In the same year, 37% of the community was 
involved in ‘safety net program’ (a polite form of food/money for work). 
They participate in some development activities, (e.g., construction of a 
                                                 
21 Interview with Adan Wario, chairman of Guchi kebele, 20 August 2007 at Guchi.  




pond or a road) for which they would be given food or money. The 
participants were then dependent directly on the state for their livelihood. 
The remaining members of the kebele had livestock which graze in far away 
satellite camps. Though most of them had a plot (obru), some of them have 
fenced it; the continuous failure of rain did not allow them to farm it. The 
Gabra are in a process of livelihood transformation, which has unintended 
consequence. They are increasingly loosing their livestock. In an 
environment where rainfall is not reliable, and there is no irrigation, farming 
is, obviously, not a dependable alternative. The people have told me 
repeatedly that such dependence on food from the state in such a huge 
proportion is unprecedented in their history.22  
In 2005, the International Committee of the Red-Cross (ICRC) offered 
a fund and the equipment as well as human resource to dig a borehole in the 
district of Moyale. A geological survey had been undertaken and Guchi was 
selected on the basis of the availability of underground water. It was 
decided that drilling of the borehole would begin in April 2006. However, 
the Gabra opposed the plan on the ground that the presence of water would 
invite the Borana to come to the Kebele for the use of the water and 
gradually outnumber them. Such a scenario obviously was envisaged as a 
threat to their ‘ownership’ right over the kebele and the new political 
identity that they are constructing.  
 
                                                 
22  This is without considering the two moments when the Gabra were displaced in large 
numbers: the first one was during the 1970s Ethiopia-Somali wars and the second was in 
1992 during a conflict between the Borana on one side and the Gabra and Garri on the 
other side. In both cases the Gabra took refuge in the neighboring countries (see Basi 1997; 
Schlee and Shongolo 1995).  





Photo by Fekadu Adugna (July 27: 2007) 
 
On 27 July 2007 I attended a one day meeting held at Guchi in which more 
than 100 elders, officials and pastoralists participated. Officials including 
the administrator and security heads of the Borana zone, administrators and 
vice administrators of Moyale and the neighboring districts also 
participated. Ritual leaders such as the abba gadaa of the Borana and the 
senior hayyu of the Gabra also participated.23 The meeting was presided 
over by the head of the security and administration office of the Borana 
Zone. The main agenda of the meeting was the proposed borehole and the 
resistance it faced from the Gabra. At the beginning, the security head made 
                                                 
23 While the Borana call the head of their gada system abba gadaa, the Gabra call their own 
hayyu. 




a speech, which was reconciliatory in its content and was meant to persuade 
the Gabra to accept the borehole project. He explained the need for water 
from the ‘state’s development agenda’ perspective. Then, the Gabra 
presented why they opposed the digging of the borehole, followed by the 
Borana’s presentation supporting the digging of the borehole. Let me 
present their exchanges: Tache (Gabra):  
 
We opposed the digging of this borehole for two reasons. First, it 
contradicts the establishment of kebele. In principle, a kebele cannot be 
established over the already existing one. Second, it damages pastoral 
life. Though not sufficient for the ardha,24 Guchi has a borehole. Digging 
another borehole is harmful. The pasture is not sufficient to 
accommodate if more livestock would come. Therefore, we do not want 
this borehole to be dug here.  
   
Another Gabra followed: 
We the Gabra have no land. So far we got only these few kebele. Borana have a 
big zone and many districts. Please do not be harsh on us for these few kebeles . . . 
 
The Borana abba gadaa responded: 
 
This land belongs to the Gabra and the Borana. The Gabra and the 
Borana do not have separate pasture and water. We have been using 
everything together. There is no border between us. If we get water here 
it belongs to Gabra, it belongs to Borana, a stranger can use it, even wild 
animals can use it… 
  
Ibren, another Gabra took the turn: 
Please, this issue is not about pasture and water, unlike the previous time. 
Discuss this issue in a proper context. It is about territory. The Borana 
want to displace us from this kebele using the digging of the borehole as 
an excuse…  
                                                 
24 Ardha is a spatial unit in the traditional Borana territorial organization which includes 
adjacent villages which participate in water and pasture management activities together 
(Bokku 2002; Hogg 1993).  





 After a long deliberation which was not always smooth, around 18:00 
o’clock a Borana elder proposed to ‘let the borehole be dug, and given to 
the Gabra to manage it, and the Borana be given the right to use’. The 
Gabra ritual leaders and elders immediately accepted the suggestion by the 
Borana elder. However, a group of Gabra youth shouted opposing the 
suggestion and their ritual leaders and elders who accepted it. Subsequently, 
they walked out of the meeting in protest. The meeting ended without any 
agreement.  
Pastoralists have been widely reported for engaging in conflicts over 
scarce water and pasture. However, this is a case where people dispute over 
a territory, even by resisting the drilling of a borehole in an area where 
water is the scarcest resource. The first speaker in the above exchange 
clearly stated that the water project would undermine their kebele. 
Controlling a kebele is not only a matter of owning a pasture and water 
resources but also a status associated to a group’s political identity that 
would bring resources from the state. The Borana were on a safe side in the 
exchange of statements because they were arguing in favor of the digging of 
the borehole, which the state also supports. They countered the Gabra’s 
exclusionary territorial claim with rhetoric of inclusion. The Borana abba 
gadaa’s response that the “…land belongs to the Borana and the Gabra…” 
that the two have everything together is a standard discourse during conflict 
resolutions. It is an inclusive and reconciliatory statement. Indeed, there is 
no border between the two groups and they use water and pasture together 
as long as they abide by the resource management rules. But, the problem 
was that the issue at hand was beyond the traditional dispute over pasture 
and water. It is, rather, about territorial occupation. The Gabra youth are 
frustrated that they might lose the hard won kebele.  
The next day, I held a discussion with two Gabra men who left the 
meeting in protest. I asked why they opposed the idea of the digging of the 
borehole, which was accepted by their ritual leaders and elders. Both had 
similar view that the dispute is about ownership right over the territory, not 
a dispute over water. They are very critical of the role of the elders and the 
ritual leaders. They elaborated that the Gabra elders lacked an 
understanding of the complex politics surrounding the territorial, power and 




resource control issues involved. Let me quote a statement from one of 
them: 
 
Allocating land is not a duty of the ritual leaders and elders; they may 
arbitrate in cases of conflict over water or pasture. What you observed 
yesterday was not about a single well but about a territory. This could be 
solved only through the state law in the constitution. Our elders do not 
know this. They do not know the advantage of kebele. That was what 
drove us crazy yesterday.25 
 
The quotation succinctly explains the current dispute between the Borana 
and Gabra. It is clearly related to the present-day ethno-territorial discourse. 
For the elite what matters are not only the economic and ecological 
rationale, but also the politics and the power relations. In other words, the 
dispute over that territory is simultaneously a struggle over identity and 
power. The elders and the ritual leaders are accused of lack of the 
knowledge how this works. In fact, the Gabra elite have been accusing the 
Gabra ritual leaders of building and maintaining a ritualized ‘depoliticized’ 
‘unrealistic’ harmonious relationship with their Borana counterparts since 
the 1970s26. Part of the elite even tried to bring the relationship to an end by 
attacking the institution – the Gabra age and generation set also called the 
‘Gabra gada’ – that make the relationship work27. The ritual leaders were 
physically attacked two times, in 1977 and 2008, and both times the drum, 
the main ritual symbol of the Gabra gada, was snatched from the ritual 
leaders and taken away. This disarming of the ritual leaders was aimed at 
delegitimizing the system28. As a result, the Gabra gada vanished two times 
and revitalized both times to survive to date in the custodianship of elders.      
                                                 
25A statement of Tache, from a discussion with Abdi and Tache, 28.July 2006, Moyale. 
26 The 1970s is a turning point in the Gabra-Borana relationship. In the second half of the 
1970s, during the Ethio-Somali war, the Gabra supported the invading Somali army while 
the Borana supported the Ethiopian government.  
27 What I called the ‘Gabra gada’ to help readers grasp it easily is usually called dhabela by 
the Gabra themselves.    
28 The skin for making the drum is obtained  from the Meta lineage of the Matari clan of 
the Borana. The stick for the drum is ritually cut only from the vicinity of a particular 




 Furthermore, the inter-generational difference was intensified this time 
due to the elders and ritual leaders’ co-optation by the state. Their activities 
are sponsored by the local administration that is dominated by the Borana. 
They get transportation services, per diem and accommodations. For 
instance, while pastoralist attendants came to the above mentioned meeting 
on foot, a few selected elders and the ritual leaders were transported by four 
wheel drive vehicles. They were paid more than the standard per diem and 
enjoyed a relatively comfortable accommodation in the town. As a result 
there were complaints from the people that the elders and the ritual leaders 
were becoming more loyal to the state than to the people they represent. 
This is isolating them from the people they represent and they are 
increasingly loosing respect and legitimacy from their own communities.   
The dispute over the kebele persisted. After the negotiation failed, both 
sides were looking for an excuse to attack each other. This happened in 
December 2006. On the 11th of December 2006 the Gabra children tending 
livestock near the Borana settlement areas were beaten by their Borana 
counterparts. In a neighboring kebele a Gabra man was killed suspected of 
stealing a Borana man’s camel. The next day two Borana (a woman and a 
man) were killed in a nearby village. On the 12th December of the same 
year, a fierce fighting took place for one day, and 34 people were killed, 
including 2 policemen. The issue has never been solved since then. In 
August 2008 the same issue was raised again and the Borana and Gabra 
exchanged strong words in a meeting held in Moyale town and in a week 
time a violent conflict erupted in the same village, 18 people reportedly 
died.29 These are not conflicts over scarce pastoral resources, they rather 
emanated from the workings of the politics of identity and ethno-
territoriality at the local level.  
    
Conclusion 
In this article, I discussed the “contemporary forms of territorialization”, to 
borrow from Dawson et al (2014:3), in Ethiopia by taking the case of the 
                                                                                                                            
Borana well. This shows how much the drum is a symbol of a smooth co-existence 
between the Gabra and the Borana. 
29 Telephone communication with Abdul Kadir, my field assistant – 16. 08.2008. 




Gabra in Southern Ethiopia. It is a case in which a pastoral territory has 
been politicized through appropriation of national political discourses. 
Indeed, the notion of territoriality is related to claim to control over 
territory, which is political (Gertel et al 2014:9).  I argued that change in the 
politico-administrative system in 1991 changed the structural background 
against which the actors debate entitlement and negotiate boundaries of 
inclusion and exclusion. Traditionally, concept of territory among the 
pastoral Gabra and Borana was embedded in ritual and ecological 
perspectives. At present, without subscribing to the contextual difference, 
emphasis is given to the significance of belonging to a certain territory.  
This, on the other hand, has fundamentally changed the meaning of 
resources. As a result, currently, resource is not that much about pasture and 
water, rather it is about territorial control; that requires creating new borders 
and new administrative units, which is also about identity.  
This has disrupted the longstanding pastoral livelihood strategies. For 
most, it affected the accommodative and cooperative resource regime. The 
ritualized mutual inter dependence between the Gabra and the Borana that 
enhanced smooth relationships for centuries has been pushed aside. Their 
long-lived socio-politically harmonious and ecologically sound way of life 
has been transformed into competitive and conflictual as well as 
ecologically incompatible way of live. This also has a very visible 
consequence on the livelihood of the Gabra as the majority of them are 
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